Control, Regulations And Legitimacy Of An Islamic Bank: An Indonesian Case Study by Adib, Noval
 
 
 
 
CONTROL, REGULATIONS AND LEGITIMACY OF AN 
ISLAMIC BANK: AN INDONESIAN CASE STUDY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOVAL ADIB 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
UNIVERSITI SAINS MALAYSIA 
2014 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONTROL, REGULATIONS AND LEGITIMACY OF AN 
ISLAMIC BANK: AN INDONESIAN CASE STUDY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
By 
 
 
 
 
 
NOVAL ADIB 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thesis submitted in fulfillment of the requirements  
for the degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
 
January 2014 
ii 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
Alhamdulillahirabbil ‘alamiin. The deepest gratitude is only to Allah, Who has blessed 
me so I can complete my study at Shool of Management-Universiti Sains Malaysia. 
I thank my supervisor, Assoc. Professor Dr. Siti-Nabiha Abdul Khalid for her guidance 
and supervision during my study. She has opened my mind and given me new insights 
during my study. My gratitude is also for Datin Dr. Joriah Muhammad and Dr. Amirul 
Shah Md. Shahbudin for their precious comments and suggestions, and also for 
Professor Fauziah Md. Taib, Dean of School of Management-Universiti Malaysia.  
My gratitude is also for my employer, Fakultas Ekonomi dan Bisnis-Universitas 
Brawijaya and The Ministry of Higher Education-Republic of Indonesia, for granting me 
scholarship for this PhD study. I also thank to mbak Sunarti and mas Budi Sudaryono 
who arranged all interviews during my fieldwork. 
My gratitude also goes to my friends, both in Universitas Brawijaya and Universiti Sains 
Malaysia. Dr. Gugus Irianto, Prof. Dr. Unti Ludigdo, Prof. Dr. Iwan Triyuwono, Pak 
Subagyo, MSi, Ak, Helmy Adam, MSA, Dr. Ali Djamhuri, Dr. Imam, Subekti, Dr. 
Aulia Fuad Rahman, Dr. Sunaryo, Dr. Jamhir Safani, Supriyanto, MSc, Dr. La Hamimu, 
Iqbal, Lutfi Haris, Dede Sadewo, Sumiadi, Dr. Fuad, Dr. Pujiharto, (Alm) Dr. Azis 
Arisudi, Dr. Hamzah Al Mawali, Dr. Hasan Basri, Dr (cand) Zainul Bahri, Parichard 
‘Ann’ Benrit, Siripat ‘Tan’, Dr. Chutima ‘Kung’ Wanbengmad, Dr. Phadet ‘Chang’ 
Toksoon, Dr. Saowanee ‘Lek’ Srikanjanarak, Dr. Raman Nordin, Dr. Muhammad 
Davood Bilraman, Dr. Sheeva Jahani, Hasmat Ali, Dr. Yousif Abdelbagi, Doddy 
iii 
 
Setiawan, Dodie Tricahyono, Dr. Badrun Susantyo, Dr. Wahyu B. Setianto, Dr. Ahmad 
Sahidah, Dr. Suyatno, Dr. Nasrullah, Dr. Nuhung, Encik Azani, pak Ishak, Najib, 
Abdalla, Ahmed, Rozaidy, Lizan, Rosni Ann, Albert Cheah, Rubel, Kak ‘Ain, Kak 
Nurul, Hanan, and there are still many friend of mine that I cannot mention them. Their 
supports are invaluable for my study completion. 
Lastly, I am very grateful to my family. My beloved wife, Dwiyani Sudaryanti and my 
kids Nafisa Ramadhania, Ghozi Akhsan Fatahillah and Rania Asyifa Rahmania, and my 
parents, ayah and umik, and also to my parents in law, bapak and mama. Their pray and 
support are another source of my energy to complete my study. I am also very grateful to 
my sisters Vella (who passed away few months before I went to study PhD), Icha and 
Belgis, and also to my brother and sisters in law Mas Budi, Yuni, Yudi, Yesi. I am also 
very grateful to Om Ful, Om Kahar, Tante Sus, Tante Vin, and other uncles and aunties. 
Being part of them is the biggest gift in my life. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iv 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS            ii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS           iv 
LIST OF TABLE            xi 
LIST OF FIGURE           xii 
LIST OF ABBREVIATION        xiii 
ABSTRAK             xiv 
ABSTRACT           xvi 
 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY 
1.1. Introduction            1 
1.2. Background of the Study          1 
1.3. Problem Statement           5 
1.4. The Objectives of the Study and Its Approach       6 
1.5. Contribution of the Study          7 
1.6. The Outline of the Thesis          8 
v 
 
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. Introduction          11 
2.2. Nature of Banking Industry        11 
2.3. Regulation and Control in the Banking Industry     14 
2.4. Good Corporate Governance of Banking      17 
2.5. The Development of Banking Regulation in Indonesia    20 
2.6. Islamic Business         23 
2.7. Islamic Banking: Brief History       26 
2.8. The Differences between Islamic Banking and Conventional Banking  30 
2.9. Islamic Banking in Theory        32 
2.10. Controlling, Regulations and Islamic Bank      37 
2.11. Risk Management of Islamic Bank       38 
2.12. Previous Researches on Regulation and Control in Islamic Bank   39 
2.13. Summary          41 
 
CHAPTER 3: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
3.1. Introduction             42 
vi 
 
3.2. Institution and the Origin of Institutional Theory      44 
3.3. Managing Institutional Environment        46 
3.3.1. Buffering Tactics         47 
3.3.2. Bridging Tactics         48 
3.3.2.1. Institutional Isomorphism        48 
3.3.2.1.1. Coercive Isomorphism        49 
3.3.2.1.2. Mimetic Isomorphism        50 
3.3.2.1.3. Normative Isomorphism        50 
3.4. The Further Elaboration of Organizational  
Responses to Institutional Processes        51 
3.5. Institutional Perspective of Control and Regulation  
in Islamic Banks           53 
3.6. Legitimacy of Organization         54 
3.7. Institutional Theory in Practice of Maintaining Legitimacy in  
Islamic Banks           59 
3.8. Summary           61 
 
 
vii 
 
                                                                                                                             
CHAPTER 4: HISTORICAL CONTEXT AND REGULATIONS OF ISLAMIC 
BANK IN INDONESIA 
4.1. Introduction          62 
4.2. The Historical Context of Islamic Banking in Indonesia    62 
4.3. General Legal Basics of Islamic Banking in Indonesia    65 
4.4. The Regulatory Framework of the Shariah Banking Industry in Indonesia 67 
4.5. Regulations for Islamic Bank in Indonesia: Ownership, Structure 
and Product          69 
4.5.1. Regulation of Ownership of Islamic Bank    70 
4.5.2. Control in Organizational Structure and Human Resource 
Management        71 
4.5.3. Control in Launching a New Product     74 
4.6. Summary         75 
 
CHAPTER 5: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
5.1. Introduction          76 
5.2. Accounting as a Social and Multi Paradigmatic Science    77 
5.3. Ontological and Epistemological Basis of Research      78 
5.4. Research Methods: Case Study       80 
viii 
 
5.5. The Case: Bank La Riba        82 
5.6. Research Visits          83 
5.6.1. Preliminary Visit        83 
5.6.2. The Fieldwork Process        84 
                       4.6.2.1. Data Generation         84 
5.7. Data Analysis          88 
5.8. Summary          89 
 
CHAPTER 6: CASE FINDINGS 
 
6.1.  Introduction         91 
6.2. The Development of Bank La Riba      91 
6.3.  Management Process of Bank La Riba     93 
6.3.1. Planning Process in Bank La Riba     93 
6.3.2. Bank La Riba Key Processes      95 
6.3.2.1.  Human Resource Management in Bank La Riba  95 
6.3.2.2.  Products of Bank La Riba     99 
6.3.2.2.1. Distributing Financing   100 
6.3.2.3. Innovations and Expansions    105 
6.3.2.4. Risk Management Process    107 
6.3.2.5.  Internal Control Process     111 
ix 
 
6.3.2.6.  Performance Evaluation System in Bank La Riba 112 
6.3.2.7.  Reward System in Bank La Riba   117 
6.3.2.8.  Information Feedback Process    120 
6.3.2.9.  Corporate Social Responsibility of La Riba  123 
6.4. Summary         126 
 
CHAPTER 7: THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF THE CASE FINDINGS 
7.1. Introduction         127 
7.2. Institutional Environment of Bank La Riba     127 
7.3. The Isomorphism Exerted by the Environmental Actors 
and The Legitimacy Gained       129 
7.3.1. Coercive Isomorphism      130 
7.3.2. Mimetic Isomorphism      136 
7.3.3. Normative Isomorphism      139 
7.4. Maintaining Legitimacy of Bank La Riba     142 
7.5.  Summary         149 
 
CHAPTER 8: CONTRIBUTIONS, LIMITATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
8.1. Introduction         151 
8.2. Recap of Research Findings       151 
8.3. Contributions         153 
8.3.1. Theoretical Contribution       153 
8.3.2. Methodological Contribution       156 
x 
 
8.3.3. Practical Contribution       156 
8.4. Limitations         158 
8.5. Recommendation to the Authority       159 
8.6. Suggestions for Future Research       159 
References          161 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
xi 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table 3.1 Range of managerial responses to institutional pressures   52 
Table 3.2 Comparison between DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) Proposition 
and the Findings of Hambrick et al. (2005) 
53 
Table 5.1 List of Interviewee 85 
Table 5.2 List of Documentary Evidence 87 
Table 6.1 Products of Bank La Riba 99 
Table 6.2 Mudharabah Financing of Bank La Riba for the Last Five Years  102 
Table 6.3 Musyarakah Financing of Bank La Riba for the Last Five Years  103 
Table 6.4 Proportion of Other Income to Main Income 107 
Table 7.1 BI Regulations after Act Number 21/2008 Concerning Shariah 
Banking 
131 
Table 7.2 Total Profit of Bank La Riba for Last Five Years 139 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
xii 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure 2.1: Process of Financial Intermediation      12 
Figure 3.1: Organizational survival (Meyer and Rowan, 1991)   57 
Figure 4.1: Organization Structure of Bank La Riba     86 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
xiii 
 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
BI:  Bank Indonesia 
CAR:  Capital Adequacy Ratio 
ICMI: Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia 
IDB:    Islamic Development Bank 
IUC:  Indonesia Ulema Council 
MUI:  Majelis Ulama Indonesia 
NIS: New Institutional Sociology 
NPF:  Non-Performing Financing 
SNB:  Shariah National Board 
SSB:  Shariah Supervisory Board 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
xiv 
 
KAWALAN, PERATURAN DAN KESAHIHAN BANK ISLAM: 
SATU KAJIAN KES DI INDONESIA 
 
ABSTRAK 
Penyelidikan ini adalah tentang bank Islam di Indonesia yang telah berjaya mengekalkan 
kewujudan dan perkembangannya sejak dua dekad pengoperasiannya di Indonesia. 
Tujuan penyelidikan ini adalah untuk memahami bagaimana pihak bank memperolehi 
dan mengekalkan kesahihan daripada pelbagai pihak yang berkepentingan, khususnya 
dari segi cara bank dikawal dan bagaimana mekanisme kawalan luaran mempengaruhi 
amalan dalaman bank. Kajian ini juga mengulas tentang sejarah perbankan. khususnya 
perbankan Islam di Indonesia untuk mendapatkan pemahaman yang kontekstual. 
Pendekatan kajian kes yang dimaklumkan oleh teori institusi sosiologi baru (New 
Institutional Sociology, NIS) dan teori legitimasi digunakan dalam penyelidikan ini. 
Teori NIS digunakan untuk menganalisis bagaimana bank Islam memberi maklum balas 
terhadap tekanan dan pengaruh daripada pihak yang berkepentingan. Teori legitimasi 
digunakan untuk menganalisis bagaimana bank Islam mendapatkan dan mengekalkan 
kesahihan daripada pihak-pihak yang berkepentingan. Data telah dijana daripada 24 
temu bual deengan pihak pengurusan bank dan pengawal selia termasuklah daripada 
bukti dokumentari dan pemerhatian. 
Kajian ini mendapati bank menghadapi pelbagai tekanan dan pengaruh tekanan yang 
paling kritikal adalah daripada pengawal selia iaitu melalui pelaksanaan kawalan dan 
peraturan. Walau bagaimanapun, tekanan tersebut kadangkala bercanggah dengan 
xv 
 
pelabur yang menuntut keuntungan yang tinggi manakala orang ramai mengharapkan 
pihak bank untuk memainkan peranan sosialnya. Pihak bank mendapati cara-cara 
inovatif untuk bertindak balas terhadap tekanan bercanggah tersebut, dan hasilnya 
memperoleh kesahihan daripada pihak-pihak berkepentingan tersebut. 
Kajian ini menyumbang kepada teori dan amalan. Penggunaan NIS dengan teori 
kesahihan tersebut menghasilkan pemahaman yang lebih baik tentang proses 
institusionalisasi di dalam sesebuah organisasi. Sekiranya teori NIS hanya menerangkan 
tentang proses institusionalisasi di dalam sesebuah organisasi, maka teori legitimasi pula 
menerangkan dengan lebih terperinci tentang kesahihan yang diperolehi dari hasil proses 
institusionlaisasi. Kajian ini juga menyumbang kepada peningkatan pemahanan tentang 
amalan bank Islam. Pematuhan terhadap nilai-nilai Islam serta peraturan-peraturannya 
tidak menghalang bank Islam daripada mencapai objektif ekonomi. Malah, bank-bank 
Islam masih kekal wujud semasa krisis ekonomi sedangkan kebanyakan bank-bank 
konvensional yang lain telah gagal beroperasi. 
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CONTROL, REGULATIONS AND LEGITIMACY OF AN ISLAMIC BANK:  
AN INDONESIAN CASE STUDY 
 
ABSTRACT 
This is a research about an Islamic bank in Indonesia that has managed to maintain its 
existence and grown over the two decades of its operation in Indonesia. The purpose of 
this research is to understand how the bank gains and maintains its legitimacy from its 
diverse stakeholders, specifically in terms of the way the bank is regulated/controlled 
and how the external control mechanism influences the bank’s internal practices of the 
bank. This research also reviews the history of banking, in general, as well as of Islamic 
banking in Indonesia to obtain a contextual understanding of the issues 
This research uses a case study approach informed by the new institutional sociology 
(NIS) and legitimacy theory. The NIS theory is used to analyse how the Islamic bank 
responds to pressure and influence from the stakeholders. The legitimacy theory is used 
to analyse how the Islamic bank gains and maintains its legitimacy from the 
stakeholders. Data were generated from 24 interviews with the management of the bank 
and as the regulators as well as from documentary evidence and observations. 
This research found that the bank faced various pressures and influences with the most 
critical pressure coming from the regulator through control and regulations. However, 
the pressures are sometimes conflicting; with investors demanding high profit while the 
public expect the bank to play a social role. The bank finds innovative ways to respond 
to such conflicting pressures, and, as a result, gains legitimacy from its stakeholders. 
xvii 
 
This research makes contributions to theory and practice. The use of NIS along with the 
legitimacy theory provides a better understanding about the institutionalization process 
in an organization. If the NIS theory only explains about the process of 
institutionalization in an organization, then the legitimacy theory explains in more detail 
about the legitimacy gained by an organisation as a result of the institutionalisation 
process. This research also contributes to improving the understanding about the practice 
of Islamic banks. The conformance to Islamic values as well as to the regulations does 
not prevent Islamic banks from pursuing economic objectives. In fact, Islamic banks 
have survived during economic crises while many other conventional banks collapsed. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY 
 
 
 
1.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter explains the reasons why the topic needs to be researched. The 
background of the research is described to clarify the underlying research problem. The 
approach that is utilized in this research is also briefly explained. Finally, the 
contributions of this research are described to depict the usefulness of this research. 
 
1.2. Background of the Study 
Islam, a religion dealing with the life of human beings, encourages business and 
provides detailed laws covering business activities, as illustrated from a verse of the 
Qur’an, "Allah has made business lawful for you" (Al Baqarah: 275). The early Muslims 
engaged not only in domestic trade, but they also went to distant lands for commercial 
trade. Consequently, Islam reached Africa and East Asia through business activity. Thus, 
business activities have played an important role in disseminating Islam worldwide.  
Currently, shariah business is growing rapidly, especially in the area of banking. 
A shariah business organization is a business institution that uses the Islamic Legal 
system (shariah) as the fundamental aspect of its operation. These fundamental aspects 
are, among others, prohibition against riba (usury), not using or selling something that is 
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unlawful (haram), no cheating or engaging in fraud, such as hiding product defects in 
marketing, etc. Currently the total asset of the Islamic finance industry are around $1.14 
trillion worldwide and is growing 10% yearly (BMB-Islamic, 2012). 
In Indonesia, shariah banking has grown rapidly, from just one bank that used 
shariah as its operational basis in 1992, it has since been followed by many other banks. 
Some banks entirely reformed their operational basis before emerging with a new name 
and identity. As at the end of 2011, the assets of Islamic banks in Indonesia totalled 149 
trillion rupiahs or 16.5 billion US dollars (Rachman and Nuraini, 2012). This means an 
increase of around 49% compared to the same period in the previous year. 
 The existence of Islamic banks is considered more significant considering that no 
single Islamic bank collapsed due to the economic crisis (Boumediene and Caby, 2010; 
Khan and Crowne-Mohammed, 2009-2010). In the case of Indonesia, even though seven 
banks were closed down by the government because of their bad condition during the 
economic crisis in 1997, none of these were Islamic bank.  
In general, an economic crisis always begins with the banking sector. In 
Indonesia, the banking crisis happened in 1997. According to the World Bank (1998), 
one of factors triggering the crisis was the weakness of the banking system in Indonesia. 
The weakness of the Indonesian banking system was used by bank owners by lending 
public funds to their own groups and to build real estate as well as an excessive number 
of condominiums, which, in turn, increased the insolvency of the banks (Tarmidi, 1999). 
The recent 2008 crisis in the US also started from the failure of one banking 
product, i.e. subprime mortgage (Gorton, 2008). Subprime mortgage is a financial 
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innovation designed to provide home ownership opportunities for those who actually are 
not bankable or riskier borrowers in the US (Gorton, 2008). Hence, not only those who 
are eligible (prime), but also those who are less eligible (subprime) can be financed to 
own a home.                                                                                                                
Further consequences can be predicted. The demand for housing increased 
rapidly in the US. Thus, the price of a house as well as the interest rate also increased. 
However, most of the demanders were less eligible or risky borrowers. Consequently, 
there was massive insolvency of the subprime mortgage just in this last decade. Such a 
situation led to the banking crisis in the US in 2007. 
On the other hand, Islamic bank managed to weather the crises due to its basic 
natures of avoiding interest-based and gharar (high speculation) business. By avoiding 
interest-based business, Islamic banks are safeguarded from the negative-spread risk; the 
risk when the interest should be paid to customers is higher than the interest taken by 
bank from the debtors. The avoidance of high speculation business also protects Islamic 
bank from the crises. All businesses conducted by Islamic bank should be based on real 
asset (asset-based business). High speculation business such as derivative can multiply 
market risk exposure relative to capital due to the pursuit of higher yield (Dodd, 2000). 
Thus, Islamic banks are protected during the crises since they do not face the same types 
of risk as compared to their conventional counterpart. 
The examples above show the need and importance of proper banking regulation 
as well as good corporate governance for banks. As an industry that is more prone to 
trouble than others, the banking industry needs to be highly regulated and controlled. 
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Unlike other industries, banks hold assets that are mostly owned by the public. Hence, 
banks need to be regulated for the protection of depositors, to ensure monetary and 
financial stability, and also an efficient and competitive financial system (Spong, 2000). 
In addition to external regulation, banks also need to implement good corporate 
governance. The need for good corporate governance is acknowledged by the Basel 
committee, which issued a directive on Banking Supervision (2006) stating that, “The 
Basel Committee is issuing this paper to supervisory authorities and banking 
organizations worldwide to help ensure the adoption and implementation of sound 
corporate governance practices by banking organizations”. 
 The proneness of banks to crisis makes their legitimacy vulnerable. Scott and 
Meyer (1991) viewed commercial banks as facing strong institutional forces. Scott 
(2003) argued that organizations, such as utilities and banks, are subject to strong 
institutional as well as strong technical pressure. Hence, it is interesting to explore how 
banks respond to control and regulation from the institutional perspective, to be exact, 
from the legitimacy perspective. Moreover, Deephouse (1996) found that regulators can 
confer legitimacy on banks. According to Stigler (1971), as quoted by Joskow et al. 
(1993), the regulatory process “automatically admits powerful outsiders to industry's 
councils”. 
 The research on the response by Islamic banks to control and regulation is more 
interesting because, unlike conventional banks, which only need obey the central bank, 
Islamic banks have two sources of regulation that should be complied with, i.e. the 
central bank and the Shariah National Board. The central bank regulates the economic 
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and management/technical aspects of the bank, while the Shariah National Board 
generates regulations that are based on Islamic principles. 
 
1.3. Problem Statement 
 As an industry that is the backbone of any economy, banking should maintain its 
continuous existence. The important role of the banking industry ensures that banks need 
to be controlled and regulated. However, the regulation and controlling of banks does 
not make them safe from the economic crisis. Indeed, based on the 1997 and 2008 
experience, the banking industry is the first sector that is harmed during an economic 
crisis. 
 The experiences of the economic crises show that Islamic banks have managed 
to maintain their existence during the crises. Islamic banks are still able to operate their 
business under such a capitalistic atmosphere, even under the ‘capitalistic crises’. As a 
bank, Islamic banks have the same basic nature as their conventional counterparts, that 
is, as a highly regulated industry. Such strict regulation of banks is to protect customers’ 
assets, to stabilize the monetary and financial system and to make the financial system 
efficient and competitive (Spong, 2000). 
 In addition to the similarities between Islamic and conventional banks, there are 
substantive differences between them. The existence of Islamic banks is based on 
Islamic principles while that of conventional banks is based on capitalistic principles. At 
the operational level, the most significant difference between them is that Islamic banks 
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strictly avoid interest-based schemes in their business while conventional banks utilise 
interest as their main source of profit. 
 To a certain extent, the different values adopted lead to different regulations 
being imposed on the respective banks. Conventional banks are only regulated by the 
central bank whereas Islamic banks are regulated by the central bank in conjunction with 
the Shariah National Board, especially for regulations pertaining to Islamic principles. 
 However, even though Islamic banks operate based on Islamic principles, they 
exist under the same atmosphere as conventional banks, that is, a capitalistic and secular 
atmosphere. Hence, Islamic banks compete with conventional banks in the same arena. 
In order to win the competition as well as to maintain their existence, Islamic banks 
should accommodate their stakeholders’ will to gain legitimacy from them. 
Hence, it is imperative to investigate the ways in which Islamic banks comply 
with the regulations imposed by the regulator as well as the demands from other 
stakeholders and to understand how Islamic banks maintain their existence by keeping 
their legitimacy high in the eyes of the stakeholders. 
  
1.4. The Objectives of the Study and its Approach 
 The focus of this research is to understand and explain how an Islamic bank 
maintains its legitimacy in its institutional environment. As such, this study seeks to 
understand the way that Islamic banks comply with the procedures or regulations or 
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adhere to the values, and, as such, obtain their legitimacy from the stakeholders. A case 
study of a large and prominent Islamic bank in Indonesia is used in this research. 
The central research question of the research is: How does Bank La Riba maintain its 
legitimacy in the eyes of its stakeholders? 
The specific research questions are as follows: 
1. How and why are Islamic banks regulated/controlled in Indonesia? 
2. How does the external control mechanism influence the internal practices of the 
bank? 
3. How does the bank maintain its legitimacy from the institutional environment 
specifically from its stakeholders? 
 
1.5. Contributions of the Study 
 This study seeks to provide a new insight into the way Islamic banks gain 
legitimacy. As such, this study is expected to contribute insights concerning how Islamic 
banks respond to the regulations controlling them. As a bank that operates based on 
Islamic principles, it has a certain mechanism for controlling and governing itself that, to 
some extent, is different from its conventional counterpart. It is hoped that the findings 
will provide new insights concerning the control and governance of Islamic banks. 
The use of institutional theory in capturing the process of control and regulation 
in Islamic banks is another contribution of this study. Rather than a process that seeks to 
attain ‘the 3 Es’, i.e. economy, efficiency and effectiveness, the institutional perspective 
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views the obedience to regulations as well as the implementation of good governance as 
being aimed to gain legitimacy from the institutional environment. 
From a practical view, it is hoped this research will provide new insights to 
management about the relationship between companies with their environment or their 
stakeholders, so that they can better manage their environment as well as their 
stakeholders. In terms of controlling and governance, a better understanding of the 
environment and the stakeholders will lead management to have good corporate 
governance that covers all stakeholders’ interests and is acceptable to their environment. 
 
 
1.6. The Outline of the Thesis 
The thesis consists of eight chapters as follows: 
 Chapter two crystallizes the research idea by reviewing the literature concerning 
Islamic banking. Firstly, the chapter describes the banking concept in general, which is 
then followed by the explanation of the regulation and control in the banking industry. 
Further the chapter explains the development of banking regulation in Indonesia. The 
nature of Islamic business in general, and, more specifically, in Islamic banking, is 
discussed further. Lastly, the chapter discusses the relationship between Islamic banks, 
control and regulation. 
 Chapter three discusses the theoretical framework that is employed to explain the 
phenomena regarding Islamic bank legitimacy in this research, i.e. the new institutional 
theory (NIS). The NIS is used because it is able to explain the interaction of an 
organization with its environment. The origin of the NIS and the environmental 
management are discussed in the second and third sections of the chapter. After the NIS 
is clearly explained, the following section discusses the control and regulation of Islamic 
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banks from the institutional perspective. The theoretical legitimacy of an organization 
and the legitimacy of Islamic banks are explained in the last two chapters. 
 Chapter four discusses the research methodology that is used in this research. 
The position of accounting within the knowledge area is clarified in the second section 
before discussing the ontological and epistemological basis of the research in the third 
section. The following sections discuss the research method used in this research. The 
rest of the chapter describes the research process consisting of a preliminary visit, data 
collection and data analysis. 
 Chapter five of the research describes the historical context and regulation of 
Islamic banks in Indonesia. The historical and the environmental context during the 
establishment process of Indonesia Islamic bank are explored. The next section in this 
chapter discusses the general legal basics underlying the operation of Islamic banks in 
Indonesia. In addition to the general legal basics, the operation of Islamic banks in 
Indonesia is also guided by more detailed regulations issued by the central bank. Such 
regulations are described in the next section of the chapter.  
 Chapter six describes the organizational case findings during the fieldwork. The 
chapter starts from a description of the development of Bank La Riba over the two 
decades of its operation. Further, the chapter discusses the key processes of the daily 
operation of Bank La Riba. The description of the key processes aims to depict the 
overall picture of the day-to-day operation of Bank La Riba. 
 The findings are then analysed theoretically in chapter seven using the new 
institutional theory (NIS) as well as the legitimacy theory. Firstly, the chapter analyses 
the institutional environment of the bank. The next section of the chapter discusses the 
isomorphism processes that take place in Bank La Riba. Along with the explanation of 
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the isomorphism processes, the legitimacies gained by Bank La Riba are also discussed. 
The final section of the chapter explains the process of maintaining the legitimacy of 
Bank La Riba. 
 Chapter eight discusses the contributions of the research, which consist of 
theoretical and practical contributions. Further, the chapter discusses the limitations 
faced during the research. Lastly, the chapter provides several recommendations for 
future research concerning the Islamic banking industry and for the regulators. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
 
2.1. Introduction  
 This chapter explains the literature supporting the idea of the research. Firstly, 
the chapter discusses the nature of the banking industry. The reason behind the 
establishment of banks and their role in economic activities is explained in this section. 
Further, as an industry that is highly regulated, the regulators of banks and the 
regulations are discussed. The viability of Islamic banks is discussed further including 
the historical context of Islamic banks and their development.   
 
 
2.2. Nature of Banking Industry 
Within economic activities, the banking sector plays a central role. Almost all 
kinds of business involve the banking industry in this modern era due to its main role as 
a distributor of financial resources. Its intermediary function makes it possible to flow 
money through savings and lending activities. By collecting funds from customers who 
deposit their money, banks then provide financing/lending to other customers. Thus, the 
deposits of customers are considered as liabilities for the bank, and, similarly, the 
lending to customers are assets of the bank. Hence, by pooling assets and liabilities, 
banks are considered to be engaging in asset transformation, which is transforming the 
value of assets and liabilities (Heffernan, 2005). 
Matthews and Thompson (2005) explained in more detail the reasons why banks 
exist. Financial intermediation is the basic reason for the existence of banks. Financial 
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intermediation is the process of borrowing by deficit units from financial institutions 
rather than directly from the surplus units themselves. Hence, financial intermediation 
involves the surplus units depositing their funds with financial institutions, which, in 
turn, are loaned to deficit units. Figure 2.1 illustrates the process of financial 
intermediation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Process of Financial Intermediation 
 
 
The nature of lenders and borrowers are different in a number of ways. 
Borrowers often desire to be lent large amounts of funds, whereas lenders usually have 
only small amounts of surplus funds. For example, an application to a bank to purchase a 
house needs more funds than can be provided by any individual lender. Thus, a bank 
acts as a mediator collecting funds from any individual depositor and then lending them 
in a larger sum to debtors. This is called ‘size transformation’ (Matthews and Thompson 
2005). 
Further, lenders usually have a short horizon for lending their funds. They want 
to have full access to their money so that they can withdraw whenever they want. 
Borrowers usually wish to secure their funds over the life of the project or investment. 
Banks can overcome this gap by offering short-term deposits for lenders and long-term 
loans for borrowers. This is called ‘maturity transformation’ (Matthews and Thompson 
2005). 
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Finally, lenders usually prefer to deposit their funds at low risk, whereas 
borrowers usually tend to invest the borrowed funds in high risk projects. Banks offer 
low risk to lenders and bear the high risk of borrowers’ projects. As compensation, 
banks charge the borrower higher than the amount that has to be remunerated to the 
lenders. This type of transformation is called ‘risk transformation’ (Matthews and 
Thompson, 2005). 
Banks also play the role as the point of payment that enables business 
transactions between the seller and buyer to take place. Although cash payment is still 
the main method in paying transactions through banks, other methods of payment also 
take place. Before the 1990s, cheques were the most popular alternative tool for 
conducting payments through a bank. However, since the mid-1990s, credit cards and 
automatic teller machines (ATM) have gained popularity in settling transactions through 
the bank. Hence, in this context, banks are involved in ownership transformation. In 
addition to their intermediary functions, banks also expand their function into non-
banking financial services, such as mortgages, asset management, insurance, sales of 
foreign exchange, and operating deposit boxes. 
Greuning and Bratanovic (2009) argued that the expansion of the functions of 
banks resulted from the development of technology and the environment that began in 
the 1980s. Such technological progress, as well as some deregulation, led banks into 
new challenges with increasing competitive pressure among banks. Banks were 
presented with opportunities to design new products and provide more services.  
Thus, whatever the kind of services offered by the banking industry, it holds and 
operates funds or assets that mostly belong to the public. Consequently, the failure of a 
bank not only impacts its depositors, but could affect the stability of the economy as a 
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whole. Greuning and Bratanovic (2009) classified the risks faced by banks into three 
categories, i.e. financial, operational and environmental risks. Financial risk consists of 
two types of risk, i.e. traditional banking risk and treasury risk. Traditional risks 
encompass balance sheet, income structure, credit and solvency risks that can result in 
loss to the bank if they are not properly managed.  Treasury risks are the ones that are 
based on financial arbitrage. They can result in a profit if the arbitrage is correct or a loss 
if it is not correct. The main categories of treasury risk are liquidity, interest rate, 
currency, and market (including counterparty) risks.  
 Operational risks encompass overall business processes including strategic 
planning, governance and organizational structure, management of staff careers and 
internal resources, product and knowledge development and customer acquisition 
approach. Environmental risks relate to the bank’s business environment, including 
macroeconomic and policy concerns, legal and regulatory factors, and the overall 
financial sector infrastructure and payment systems of the jurisdictions in which it 
operates (Greuning and Bratanovic, 2009). 
 
2.3. Regulation and Control in the Banking Industry 
The nature of bank activities, which always deals with some risks, is the reason 
why – unlike other types of industry – banks need to be highly regulated and controlled. 
Banking is a fragile business because it depends on the confidence of its depositors. 
Spong (2000) explained the purposes of bank regulation as follows: protection of 
depositors, monetary and financial stability, efficient and competitive financial system 
and consumer protection. Matthews and Thompson (2005) argued that the main reasons 
for banking regulation are threefold. First, consumers lack market power and are prone 
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to exploitation from the monopolistic behaviour of banks. Second, depositors are 
uninformed and unable to monitor banks, and, therefore, require protection. Finally, 
banking regulation is needed to ensure the safety and stability of the banking system. 
The protection of depositors is the most basic reason for banking regulation 
because they hold a significant portion of their money in banks. Bank depositors have 
more difficulty than customers of other types of business in protecting their interest. 
Spong (2000) explained in more detail how bank regulators produce regulations for 
banks. Bank regulators put their self in the depositors’/creditors’ shoes when they set 
regulations. In other words, a bank regulator has much the same concerns as creditors 
and takes much the same steps. For example, creditors try to limit a borrower’s risk or 
charge more for higher risks. Creditors also try to limit their own exposure and increase 
a borrower’s stake in the transaction by securing collateral for the loans they make and 
by limiting a borrower’s indebtedness relative to his or her income and resources. A 
creditor may also want to impose restrictions on a borrower’s activities and use of assets 
and undertake periodic investigations of the borrower’s operations. 
Bank regulators take many similar steps in an effort to control banking risks and 
thereby protect depositors and ensure financial stability. Banks, for instance, are 
restricted to certain activities and must maintain adequate capital relative to assets and 
operational risks. They are also expected to maintain enough low-risk liquid securities to 
cover normal fluctuations in deposits. They are regularly examined, and bank 
supervisors will impose tighter restrictions on banks if their condition declines (Spong, 
2000). 
The purpose of bank regulation concerning monetary and financial stability is 
related to the vast number of transactions conducted by people and business through 
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banks. A safe and acceptable means of payment is needed or else serious disruptions will 
occur if the vast number of transactions via banks cannot be accomplished with a high 
degree of certainty and safety. Hence, bank regulation should ideally prevent such 
fluctuation in business activity and problems at individual banks from interrupting the 
flow of transactions across the economy and threatening public confidence in the 
banking system. 
According to Spong (2000), a good banking system is one that can provide good 
services to customers with competitive prices. Therefore, bank regulation should create a 
regulatory framework that supports efficiency and competition and ensures an adequate 
level of banking services throughout the economy. 
Finally, the interests of customers should be protected during their business 
relationship with banks, because consumer protection is a key part of banking regulation 
(Spong 2000). Spong (2000) then classified consumer protection into three general 
categories or objectives. Two can be classified broadly as disclosure laws and civil 
rights laws. The third category consists of laws designed to protect a consumer’s privacy 
and provide safeguards against specific abuses in the extension, collection, and reporting 
of consumer credit. 
Regulations for the banking industry are set and issued by a central bank. The 
modern central bank is a government institution and does not compete with banks 
operating in the private banking sector (Heffernan, 2005). Its main functions are 
monetary control and price stability, which is related to money supply circulation in a 
country; prudential control, which is related to customers’ protection; and government 
debt placement on the most favourable terms possible (Heffernan, 2005). 
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2.4. Good Corporate Governance of Banking 
The nature of bank activities that always deal with some risks require banks to 
apply good governance in their daily operation. Applying good governance will 
minimize the risks faced by a bank. Gruining and Bratanovic (2009) defined corporate 
governance as including setting corporate objectives with the bank’s risk profile, 
aligning corporate activities and behaviour with the expectation that management will 
operate the bank in a safe and sound manner, running day-to-day operations within an 
established risk profile and in compliance with applicable laws and regulations, while 
protecting the interests of depositors and other stakeholders. 
Cooper (2009) explained why the banking industry needs different corporate 
governance than other industries. First, banks are subject to government regulations. 
Regulatory agencies ensure the safety and soundness of financial institutions and are 
able to discipline those banks that do not conform to this ideal. Second, banks have little 
equity in their capital structure compared with firms in other industries. Third, because 
of the importance of banks for the economy as a whole, bank directors should be held to 
a higher standard than directors in other industries (Cooper, 2009). 
The implementation of good governance has been recognized worldwide. The 
Basel committee on Banking Supervision (2006) has established the principles of 
corporate governance for banking organizations. In the introduction, The Basel 
committee stated that, “The Basel Committee is issuing this paper to supervisory 
authorities and banking organizations worldwide to help ensure the adoption and 
implementation of sound corporate governance practices by banking organizations”. 
According to The OECD principles, corporate governance is defined as: 
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“Corporate governance involves a set of relationships between a company’s 
management, its board, its shareholders and other stakeholders. Corporate 
governance also provides the structure through which the objectives of the 
company are set, and the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring 
performance are determined. Good corporate governance should provide 
proper incentives for the board and management to pursue objectives that are 
in the interests of the company and its shareholders, and should facilitate 
effective monitoring”. 
 
 At a country level, the central bank plays the central role of ensuring good 
governance by establishing, monitoring and then evaluating the standards of operation 
for banks in order for them to operate accountably. Joskow et al. (1993) argued that 
regulators have different interests to shareholders in terms of the form of good 
governance. Regulators focus on safety and soundness while the focus of shareholders is 
on wealth maximization (see also Booth et al., 2002).  However, the implementation of 
good governance is costly (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Baker and Gompers, 2003).   
Therefore it is not feasible for regulators to monitor all firms’ activities because it is 
costly to monitor a firm’s actions as they cannot control the daily operations (Stigler and 
Friedland (1962), as quoted by Becher and Frye, 2011). 
 The relationship between regulation and governance raises the issue of whether 
they are a substitute or complementary. Previous studies show conflicting results. Using 
a sample of 2000 CEOs employed by more than 1000 firms, Joskow et al. (1993) found 
that CEOs of regulated firms are paid less than CEOs of unregulated firms. The use of 
CEO as a proxy for corporate governance implementation is based on John and Senbet’s 
(1998) study. John and Senbet (1998) argued that the board of directors are presumed to 
carry out the monitoring function on behalf of shareholders because the shareholders 
will face difficulty in controlling the company by themselves because of the wide 
dispersion of ownership of common stock. Bryan and Hwang (1997) argued that 
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regulation can affect CEO compensation through limitations on the scope of the CEO's 
job, reduction in the investment opportunity set, increased monitoring, and increased 
political pressure. By using CEO compensation data for a regulated industry, i.e. electric 
utility companies, Bryan and Hwang (1997) found that in a less rigid regulatory 
environment, incentive-based compensation of the CEOs is higher than for those who 
exist in a more rigid regulatory environment.  
Booth et al. (2002) also found there is negative relationship between regulation 
and internal control mechanism. They gathered data for firm value, assets, common 
stock owned by insiders and the percentage of independent outside directors from 300 
samples of firms consisting of the 100 largest banks, 100 utility firms and 100 firms 
other than bank or utilities industries. The result is that the monitoring by independent 
outside directors acts as substitute for officer and director ownership. For firms in which 
officer and director stock ownership is high, the percentage of independent outside 
directors on the board is smaller. 
 However, there are other findings that are contradictory to the substitute 
argument. Wang et al. (2010) argued that regulators play an important role even in the 
presence of monitoring. Adams and Ferreira (2008) contended that board oversight is a 
complement to regulation. Becher and Frye (2011) found that the relationship between 
regulation and governance is complementary. They contended that the presence of 
regulators can pressure firms to adopt effective corporate governance. Roengpitya 
(2007) stated that external governance mechanisms do not replace the internal 
mechanisms in banks. Roengpitya (2007) used the board composition of banks, 
especially the proportion of the outside board directors (OBD), to implicate bank 
governance. He studied whether and how deregulation affects the structure of the bank 
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board of directors, from which some implications of governance can be drawn. Adams 
and Mehran (2003) argued that the board of directors of a banking firm plays a crucial 
role in its governance structure because the nature of a banking firm is that it has a 
number of parties with a stake that may complicate its governance.  
Prowse (1997) stated that regulatory intervention is an important control 
mechanism in publicly traded banks. McLaughlin and Safieddine (2008) found that 
regulation can lessen information asymmetry in a regulated firm. They compared pre 
and post-issue operating performance between industrial and regulated firms. The results 
show that industrial firms experience a statistically significant difference in abnormal 
operating performance, wherein there is a significant decrease of abnormal operating 
performance of industrial firms from the pre-issue to the post-issue period. Whereas, 
regulated firms show an insignificant difference for abnormal operating performance 
between the pre-issue and post-issue period (McLaughlin and Safieddine, 2008). 
 
2.5. The Development of Banking Regulation in Indonesia 
 Until 1982, the banking industry in Indonesia was based on Act no. 13/1968 
concerning the central bank and some articles in Act no. 14/1967. Both acts were the 
first systematic regulation concerning the banking industry in Indonesia. Previously, the 
regulation of banking in Indonesia was Act no. 24/1951, which was an adoption of 
Dutch law – the colonizer of Indonesia – De Javashe Bank Wet (Law of the Bank of 
Java).  
However, those regulations (the Acts of 1967 and 1968) were seen as over-
regulating considering the development of global economic and business (Bank 
Indonesia, undated-c). In the 1980s, the economy of Indonesia was threatened due to the 
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global decrease of oil and gas prices. This situation eroded most of the national revenue 
of Indonesia since the value of oil and gas export was 79.11% of the total exports of 
Indonesia and about 64.16% of Indonesia’s tax revenue was from oil and gas tax.  This 
was a vulnerable economic condition since the economic structure of Indonesia mostly 
depended on external sources, i.e. oil and gas exports.  
The hard economic condition led the government to optimize the involvement of 
the private sector in financing the development in Indonesia. For that reason, the role of 
the banking sector was optimized to maximize its intermediary function. Consequently, 
the Indonesian central bank, i.e. Bank Indonesia (BI) issued a package of regulation 
called ‘Paket Juni 1983’ (June package 1983) containing some deregulation of the 
banking industry, such as the elimination of the lending limit and banks were free to set 
their interest rate (floating rate) for lending and depositing (Bank Indonesia, undated-a). 
 The deregulation succeeded in increasing the competitive environment among 
banks. Many banks, primarily private banks, took the initiative to determine the 
direction of their business. BI strengthened the bank monitoring system, particularly by 
identifying and listing ‘bad persons’ (Daftar Orang-Orang Tercela), i.e. those who have 
committed fraud or crime in the banking industry. Hence, those who were on the black 
list should not be involved in the banking industry. 
 In 1988, the government of Indonesia, in conjunction with BI, continued to issue 
further deregulation of the banking industry through ‘Paket Oktober 1988 (October 
Package 1988), which was a return point of the banking restriction policy that had been 
applied since 1971. Through the October Package 1988, the restriction of the 
establishment of a new bank as well as its branches was eased by the government. The 
restriction of the establishment of rural banks was also eased. By having only 10 billion 
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rupiahs (equal to 4 million US dollars at that time) anyone could establish a commercial 
bank or 50 million rupiahs (equal to 40 thousand US dollars at that time) for a rural 
bank. Such easiness to establish bank had never been enjoyed by the industry before. 
This resulted in the rapid growth of the banking sector. Foreign loans also flowed 
through the banking or non-banking financial institutions to finance the consumptive 
sector. 
However, the October Package 1988 also had negative side effects, such as the 
abuse of power by the management of some banks. This condition led to the regulator 
issuing another regulation obliging banks to operate their business prudently and 
cautiously. The regulation was called Paket Februari 1991 (The February Package 
1991). The main feature of this regulation was the requirement that a bank’s capital 
adequacy ratio (CAR) should be at least 8%. Thus, banks should strengthen their own 
capital to at least 8% of their total assets. 
In 1992, the government issued the Banking Act thereby replacing Act number 
14/1967. This Act was part of the deregulation of the banking industry in Indonesia. 
Some aspects that were regulated in the Act were about banking structure, scope of 
activities, requirements of establishing a new bank, professionalism enhancement of 
bank’s management and protection of the public funds by applying prudential principles 
and fulfilment of the bank’s healthiness requirement. Since then, there was a change in 
bank classification, i.e. commercial bank and rural bank. The new Act also gave an 
opportunity for the establishment of Islamic banks by allowing financing based on the 
profit-loss sharing principle. 
Between 1992 and 1993, Indonesian banks faced the problem of an increase in 
bad debt. The problem brought losses to banks. Thus, they were reluctant to expand their 
23 
 
lending. In addition, banks were hesitant to distribute their lending due to the tight rules 
of banking management. To overcome such problems, the BI issued Paket Mei 1993 
(The May Package 1993), which loosened the prudential principles of banks. The result 
was very significant. In 1994, Indonesia experienced economic growth primarily in the 
property sector. The May Package 1993 brought high growth in bank lending in a very 
short time. Even though the BI sought to limit the lending of banks, the large amount of 
lending was distributed to many sectors, especially to the property sector. Consequently, 
the economy overheated and the inflation rate increased rapidly. 
In 1996, the BI sought to overcome the overheated economy by using moral 
suasion to banks to decrease their lending expansion. The result was that the amount of 
lending decreased some months later. However, the situation was too complicated to 
control. The expansion of banking was very hard to control. This situation led the 
government to liquidate seven banks that nearly collapsed in 1997 (Bank Indonesia, 
undated-b). The very high cost of the banking failure had to be paid for by the 
Indonesian government. The Economist (2003), as quoted by Noy (2004), estimated that 
about US 75 billion was paid to bail out the banking failure and called it “the most 
expensive bail-out in world history”. 
 
2.6. Islamic Business 
There is much evidence that Islamic business works well in the real world like 
other businesses. The Islamic capital market, Islamic Insurance or Takaful, Islamic 
Banking, Islamic Investing, are some testament to its success and continued growth. 
These Islamic businesses significantly shaped the discourse of Islamic economics. Vogel 
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and Hayes (1998, p. 2) captured the essence of growth in Islamic understanding in their 
statement: 
In the last three decades it has emerged as one of the most significant and 
successful modern implementations of the Islamic legal system, and a test 
case for future Islamic legal innovation and development. 
 
According to Vogel and Hayes (1998), Islamic finance (and Islamic economics 
and business) is not an invention of this century’s Islamic extremist political movements 
but stems from injunctions found in the Qur’an and the sayings of Prophet Muhammad. 
These are inspired central tenets in the religious law of Islam concerning commercial 
dealings. The centuries-old practice of finance in Islamic form was largely eclipsed 
during the period of the European colonial empires, when almost the entire Islamic 
world came under the rule of Western powers (Vogel and Hayes, 1998). 
Chapra (2003) classified the development of economics in five stages. The first 
stage is the early form of economics when Adam Smith published his book, The Wealth 
of Nations. At this stage there is no role of any institution except markets in 
distributing and allocating resources. The term of laissez faire (free from any 
intervention) was applied at this stage. Therefore, the role of the family, the society, 
the state, and moral value was totally ignored. 
The second stage is economics with an aggressive role played by the state. The 
reason underlying the active role of government was due to some newly independent 
countries after the Second World War, which faced difficulty in accelerating 
development solely through the market forces. Since the state did not generally have 
adequate resources for playing the role, there were large budgetary deficits. These were 
financed by means of monetary expansion, and, subsequently, led to inflation and a 
